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The principle of proportionality applied to
biometrics in France: Review of ten years of
CNIL’s deliberations
Claire Gayrel *
Senior Researcher at CRIDS (Research Centre in Information, Law and Society), University of Namur, Namur,
Belgium
A B S T R A C T
The Council of Europe recommends promoting proportionality when dealing with biomet-
ric data, notably by “1) limiting their evaluation, processing and storage to cases of clear
necessity, namely when the gain in security clearly outweighs a possible interference with
human rights and if the use of other, less intrusive techniques does not suffice; 2) provid-
ing individuals who are unable or unwilling to provide biometric data with alternative methods
of identification and verification; (. . .)”. France counts as a pioneering Member State in ad-
dressing the specific data protection risks raised by the increasing development of biometrics,
in particular in the private sector. Since 2004, the French Data Protection Authority, the CNIL,
has been empowered to prior check the proportionality of biometric systems deployed in
the private sector. It also enforces in practice the articulation between the necessity test
and the consent requirement. The present contribution reviews 10 years of CNIL’s deci-
sions with respect to biometric systems, then identifies and further discusses the criteria
taken into account to apply the necessity test and the consent requirement.









Biometric technologies are no longer an exclusive preroga-
tive of law enforcement actors, a monopoly of public power.
Technological advances in the field and reduction of costs are
carrying biometric technologies beyond the fields of foren-
sics, border control and national identification into citizens’
everyday life.1 The special nature of biometric data,2 notably
due to their relative uniqueness, universality and stability,3 has
* CRIDS (Centre de Recherche en Information, Droit et Société), Faculté de droit, Université de Namur, Rempart de la Vierge 5, B-5000
Namur, Belgium. Tel.: +3281725206; fax: +3281725202.
E-mail address: claire.gayrel@unamur.be.
1 Under the dir. Ayse Ceyhan & Pierre Piazza, L’identification biométrique, Champs, acteurs, enjeux et controverses, Editions de la Maison des
sciences de l’homme, Paris, 2011.
2 We will refer here to the definition provided by the Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 03/2012 on developments in biometric technologies,
27 April 2012, WP193, pp. 3–4: “biological properties, behavioural aspects, physiological characteristics, living traits or repeatable actions where those
features and/or actions are both unique to that individual and measurable, even if the patterns used in practice to technically measure them involve
a certain degree of probability”.
3 Nancy Yue Liu, Bio-Privacy, Privacy Regulations and the Challenge of Biometrics, Routledge, Abingdon, 2012, pp. 67–68.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2016.01.013
0267-3649/© 2016 Claire Gayrel. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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been underlined to advocate for a specific legal protection,
whether under special legislation4 or by extending the defi-
nition of sensitive data to include biometric data under general
data protection legislation.5
The Council of Europe was swift to raise concerns regard-
ing the rapid development of biometric technologies. Already
in 2005, the Consultative Committee of the Council of Europe
argued for a not too rapid installation of these systems con-
sidering that “an all too enthusiastic rapid introduction may entail
unforeseen effects that are hard to reverse”.6 The Parliamentary As-
sembly further adopted a resolution calling upon Member States
to elaborate a standardized definition of biometric data, revise
existing data protection legislations by adjusting them to the
specificities of biometric technologies, recommend the use of
a biometrics template instead of raw biometrics whenever pos-
sible, and promote proportionality in dealing with biometric
data, notably by « 1) limiting their evaluation, processing and storage
to cases of clear necessity, namely when the gain in security clearly
outweighs a possible interference with human rights and if the use
of other, less intrusive techniques does not suffice; 2) providing in-
dividuals who are unable or unwilling to provide biometric data with
alternative methods of identification and verification; (. . .)”7 The prac-
tical application of this recommendation demands that we
articulate the well-known requirements of necessity and of in-
dividual consent, both of which progress from European
fundamental rights instruments and data protection
law.8 In practice, both requirements may be difficult to articu-
late when applied to biometric systems deployed in the private
sector. Indeed, if a biometric system is clearly necessary, is there
any place for individual consent, and thus the possibility to
object? Besides, how exactly is the gain in security to be weighed
against the interference in individual rights?
By 2014, only a few countries had adopted legislation and
regulation specifically aimed at the issue of biometric data
and biometric system, among which France counts as a pio-
neering Member State in the field.9 Since 2004, the processing
of biometric data is specifically foreseen in the Information
Technology and Civil Liberties Act.10 It provides that biomet-
ric applications carried out by the State for the identification
or verification of identity of individuals must be authorized
by Decree after consultation of the CNIL,11 and that other
“automatic processing comprising biometric data necessary for the
verification of an individual’s identity” are submitted to the prior
authorization of the CNIL.12 The CNIL is therefore empow-
ered to apply the principle of proportionality described above,
and enforces in practice the articulation between the neces-
sity and consent requirements. All decisions being publicly
available, its experience in this field over the last decade
affords an interesting case study. The present contribution
reviews 10 years of CNIL’s deliberations with respect to bio-
metric systems, as well as identifying and discussing the
criteria taken into account when applying the necessity test
and the consent requirement.
The scope of the present review is limited to the deploy-
ment of biometric systems in the private sector, leaving aside
the deployment of biometric systems by the State, which are
subject to the adoption of a Decree. Instead, we will specifi-
cally focus on those situations in which the CNIL is empowered
to authorize or refuse the installation of biometric systems
which, in practice, broadly speaking covers all biometric iden-
tification carried out in the private sector (including public
institutions or public services, as long as they cannot be
considered as acting in the course of a public State mission).
In compliance with the Information Technology and Civil
4 Els Kindt, Privacy and Data Protection Issues of Biometric Applica-
tions, A Comparative Analysis, Springer, 2013, in particular pp. 822–
829 and chapter 9, “A legal model for the use of biometric data in
the private sector”, pp. 831–896.
5 This approach appears to have been retained in the modern-
ization process of European legal data protection instruments, which
should provide a specific status to biometric data. See the draft pro-
tocol amending the Convention 108 for the Protection of Individuals
with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, CM (2015)40,
providing that the processing of “biometric data uniquely identi-
fying a person” shall only be allowed where specific and additional
appropriate safeguards are enshrined in law, complementing those
of the Convention (art. 6). The draft explanatory report defines the
processing of biometric data as those “resulting from a specific tech-
nical processing of data concerning the physical, biological or
physiological characteristics of an individual, which allows the
unique identification or authentication of the latter”. This defini-
tion is more restricted than the one of the Working Party 29 (see
footnote 2) since it excludes behavioural characteristics, such as
gait analysis.
6 Consultative Committee on the Convention for the protection
of Individuals with regard to the automatic processing of per-
sonal data (T-PD), Progress Report on the application of the principle
of Convention 108 to the collection and processing of biometric data
(2005), p. 8. In a landmark case, the Court of Strasbourg also raised
concerns regarding the possible future uses, yet unknown, of bio-
metric data and gave strong weight to this argument to qualify the
collection of DNA data as an interference into individuals’ rights
under Article 8 of the ECHR in its judgement S. and Marper v. the
United Kingdom, 4 December 2008.
7 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1797 (2011)
on the need for a global consideration of the human rights impli-
cations of biometrics of 11 March 2011.
8 In particular, the requirement of necessity to justify interfer-
ences into individuals’ right to private life is provided in Article 8
of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and Articles
7 & 52§1 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The require-
ment of consent is now enshrined in Article 8 of the EU Charter.
See also article 7 a) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on
the free movement of such data, OJEC L 281, 23 November 1995.
9 Paul de Hert & Koen Christianen, Council of Europe Progress Report
on the application of the principles of convention 108 to the collection and
processing of biometric data, January 2014.
10 Act No. 78-17 of 6 January 1978 on Information Technology, Data
Files and Civil Liberties – Loi No. 78-17 Informatique et Libertés du
6 Janvier 1978 – as amended, available here: http://www.cnil.fr/
fileadmin/documents/en/Act78-17VA.pdf (last accessed 1/11/2015).
11 Article 27§2 of the Information Technology and Civil Liberties
Act.
12 Article 25§8 of the Information Technology and Civil Liberties
Act.
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Liberties Act, the CNIL has adopted unique authorizations13
regarding a limited processing list for biometric data, now
submitted to a simplified declaration: Decision AU-007 on
the use of hand geometry to control access to work premises
and mass catering14; Decision AU-008 on the use of finger-
printing exclusively stored in a personal device to control
access to professional premises15; Decision AU-009 regarding
the use of hand geometry to control access to school
restaurants16; Decision AU-019 on the use of vein pattern
recognition to control access to professional premises17; De-
cision AU-027 on the use of fingerprinting in professional
laptops.18 All other processing procedures remain subject to
prior examination and authorization of the CNIL.
In total, about 4850 biometric systems have been notified
to the CNIL between 2005 and 2014.19 About 4400 concern simple
declarations and 458 special decisions, among which 101
systems have been refused, an average of about 2% only. The
work environment is indisputably the context where biomet-
rics is the most prevalent (≈84% of biometric systems),20 followed
by schools (≈15%),21 and the use of biometrics for research or
experimental purposes (≈1%). The use of biometrics in com-
mercial environment or for other purposes represents less than
1% of biometric systems in France.
We have conducted a thorough analysis of 458 delibera-
tions (comprising both authorizations and refusals) of the CNIL,
delivered in compliance with its power of special authoriza-
tion within the decade from 2005 to 2014.22 The proportion of
special deliberations relating to these different contexts and uses
also confirms that employers are those who most request special
authorizations (363 special decisions), followed by the re-
search field (41 decisions) and service providers/commercial
premises (29 decisions). Only a few deliberations relate to schools
(16 decisions), showing that other uses of biometrics outside the
conditions authorized by AU-009 are undeveloped. Finally, a small
number of decisions (9 decisions) relate to other contexts or cat-
egories of individuals, including students or vulnerable people.
13 Article 24 of the Information Technology and Civil Liberties Act.
14 Unique Authorization AU-007 – Deliberation n°322–2012 of 20
September 2012.
15 Unique Authorization,AU-008 – Deliberation n°102–2006 of 27 April
2006.
16 Unique Authorization, AU-009 – Deliberation n°103–2006 of 27
April 2006.
17 Unique Authorization, AU-019 – Deliberation n°316–2009 of 7
May 2009.
18 Unique Authorization, AU-027 – Deliberation n°074–2011 of 10
March 2011.
19 This figure derives from the figures published by the CNIL in
its Annual Reports over the period 2005–2014 and from the Report
of Senator François Pillet to the Senate of 16 April 2014, available
here: http://www.senat.fr/rap/l13-465/l13-4651.pdf (last accessed
1/11/2015).
20 The proportion of biometric systems in the work environ-
ment is estimated on the basis of the number of simple declarations
(All declarations relate to the work environment except AU-009)
and special deliberations (special authorizations and refusals) con-
cerning the enrolment of employees.
21 In its 2010 Annual Report, the CNIL mentions that about 400
biometric systems have been notified to the CNIL in accordance
with the Authorisation unique AU-009 (adopted in 2006) for access
control to school catering, an average of 100 declarations per year.
No other figures have been published further. For the purpose of
our estimation, we have raised this number up to 800 (following
the average of 100 declarations per year). See CNIL’s Annual Report
2010, p. 31 here: http://www.cnil.fr/fileadmin/documents/La
_CNIL/publications/CNIL_rapport_annuel_%202010.pdf (last ac-
cessed 1/11/2015).
22 All these deliberations have been classified according to some
pre-defined essential context-related information and character-
istics of the systems: i) date of the decision; ii) authorization or
refusal; iii) activity of the requesting entity (such as “laboratory”,
“casino”, “hospital/health establishment”, “industry/fabrics”, “other
private firms”, “firms in the field of surveillance/security technol-
ogy”, “association”, “school establishment”, “banking/financial
sector”, “research”, “experience”, and “other”); iv) categories of people
enrolled in the system (“minors”, “employees/habilitated persons”,
“customers/users of public services”, “patients”, “volunteers”, “vul-
nerable people”, “students”, “other”; v) type of system (“simple” or
“multimodal”); vi) type of biometric characteristics collected (“fin-
gerprint”, “finger vein”, “palm vein”, “hand geometry”, “iris”, “voice”,
“DNA”, “face recognition”); vii) purposes pursued (“identity fraud”,
“general security”, “access control to applications/devices/”, “access
control to restricted area”, “other”); viii) legal basis invoked
(“consent”, legitimate interests of the controller”); ix) place of storage
of the biometric data (“individual device”, “terminal/reader”, “central
storage/server”)/.
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We will now analyse in more detail the requirements applied
by the CNIL and the concrete situations in which biometrics
was deemed (or not) proportionate within the work environ-
ment (2), the school environment (3), the commercial
environment (4), in the research field (5) and in residual cases
(6). Finally, we will see how CNIL’s policy is being reconsid-
ered (7).
2. Biometrics in the work environment
79% (364) of CNIL’s deliberations concern the enrolment of em-
ployees in biometric systems, among which a proportion of
three-quarters have been authorized (272 authorizations for
92 refusals). The work environment is indisputably the context
where biometrics is presently the most expanded and em-
ployers are those who are the most requesting special
authorizations for biometric systems to the CNIL. Such systems
are deemed necessary for a variety of purposes: access control
to specific restricted areas (≈33%), general security of the work
area/premises (≈28%), access control to professional applica-
tions, devices or network (≈21%), control of the working time
of employees (≈14%) and other uses (demonstration, exhibi-
tion, other . . . about 3%).
CNIL’s policy with respect to biometrics in the work envi-
ronment requires that the use of biometrics for working time
management purposes be distinguished (1) from the use of bio-
metrics for security-related purposes, which represents the
majority of biometric uses. Within this category, one must
further distinguish the use of biometrics in situations of “press-
ing security need” (2) and the use of biometrics for general
security purposes (3).
2.1. The management of working time
CNIL’s position regarding the use of biometrics for control-
ling the working time of employees has evolved substantially
in the last decade, from a careful authorization of the use of
hand geometry, towards a general prohibition of the use of any
biometrics for such purposes.
The use of biometric systems to manage employees’ working
time was one of the first uses to be submitted to the CNIL for
prior consultation. In 1999, the CNIL delivered an opinion re-
garding the use of such systems by a local prefecture and the
national airport Roissy-Charles de Gaulle. In both cases, the
systems relied on the use of fingerprint, and the CNIL con-
cluded that the collection of such biometric data was
disproportionate.23 In its 2001 activity report, the CNIL pro-
vided a summary of its doctrine regarding biometrics, relying
on the distinction between biometric data leaving trace and bio-
metric data leaving no trace. The CNIL explained that fingerprint
or DNA, contrary to some other biometric characteristics, can
be collected and exploited without the individual’s knowl-
edge and are susceptible to further exploitation for incompatible
purposes.24 In 2001, the CNIL lists the iris, voice and hand ge-
ometry as biometric data leaving no trace, nevertheless
highlighting the possibility of revising this list in the light of
technological advances.25
After a series of refusals,26 the CNIL eventually authorized
a biometric system based on hand geometry27 and further
adopted the unique authorization AU-007 regarding the use of
hand geometry for work-time management of employees and
access control to professional premises.28 The recourse to hand
geometry, a biometric characteristic that was deemed “without
trace”, was then considered less problematic than fingerprint
and therefore considered a priori proportionate.
However, the CNIL reviewed its position in 2012 and ex-
cluded the purpose of work-time management from the scope
of the unique authorization AU-007.29 This reversal of opinion
is remarkable and appears to arise from resistance among
labour unions to the generalization of biometrics in this ex-
tremely sensitive area of the relationship between employees
and their employers. After 2006, the CNIL organized a consul-
tation among relevant stakeholders, in particular labour unions,
employers’ associations and other professionals in France. Ac-
cording to the CNIL, the outcome of the consultation
demonstrated a consensus among them against the use of bio-
metric systems for time control and time management of
employees. The main reason put forward is that biometric
systems would negatively impact the traditional relationship
of confidence between employers and employees, with the risk
that this could damage the social climate.30 Where time control
and time management of employees are deemed necessary,
the stakeholders considered traditional systems (without bio-
metrics) to be sufficient. Use of biometrics for such purposes,
regardless of the biometric characteristic, is now considered
a priori disproportionate. Several authorization requests have
since been submitted to the CNIL (24 requests in 2013 and 5
in 2014), but these have systematically been rejected. This pro-
hibition of biometrics in the employment context is interesting,
as it shows that applying the proportionality principle to bio-
metrics does not only rely on the characteristics of the system
(type of data, type of storage, function of the system etc.), but
remains primarily dominated by contextual and cultural aspects
that concern its objectives and its environment.
23 Deliberation n°057-00 of 16 November 2000, opinion about the
use of fingerprint for the purposes of controlling the working time
of employees by the Prefecture of Hérault. See also CNIL’s annual
report 2000, pp. 111–113.
24 CNIL’s annual report 2001, p. 171, available here: http://www
.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/
024000377.pdf (last accessed 1/11/2015).
25 Idem.
26 Deliberation n°031–2005, n°034–2005, n°035–2005, n°036–2005,
n°037–2005 of 17 February 2005, all refusing the use of fingerprint
for working time management purposes.
27 Deliberation n°135–2005 of 14 June 2005 authorizing the Hos-
pital Centre of Hyères to use hand geometry for controlling the
working time of employees.
28 Deliberation n°101–2006 of 27 April 2006, Unique authoriza-
tion AU-007 regarding the use of hand geometry for access control
to professional premises, catering and working time manage-
ment of employees.
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2.2. Situations of “pressing security need”
Besides the monitoring of working time, biometric systems are
widely used for security reasons in the work environment. For
certain types of systems, the CNIL normally requires a “press-
ing security need”. The criterion of the existence of a “pressing
security need” is indeed essential in CNIL’s policy, when evalu-
ating the necessity of storing biometric data that either leaves
a trace or presents a high level of accuracy within a central da-
tabase, or with a view to identifying individuals.
The CNIL considers that “the constitution of a fingerprint da-
tabase can only be admitted in particular circumstances where the
identification of individuals is required by a pressing security need”.31
In such cases, the collection and central storage of biometric
data leaving trace, in particular fingerprints can be justified in
view of identifying individuals. The CNIL elaborated this issue
earlier32 and has consistently recalled this doctrine in its de-
liberations. Cases of “pressing security need” have further been
interpreted as situations where a biometric system aims at con-
trolling access to a “delineated area” representing a “major stake,
which surpasses the strict interest of the organization”.33 In those
cases, the CNIL authorizes the use of fingerprints, alone or com-
bined with another biometric characteristic, and their central
storage (in a reader or in a central server). These systems are
usually considered more intrusive into individual’s rights to
privacy and data protection than the storage of the biometric
characteristic in an individual device. The issue of storage in
the field of biometrics is crucial for the security of the bio-
metric data. Indeed, centralized storage of biometric
characteristics, even in the form of templates, presents higher
levels of risk in case of accidental loss, alteration, unauthor-
ized disclosure or access.34
Moreover, although it is not made clear in CNIL’s delibera-
tions, biometric systems that are justified on the ground of a
“pressing security need” appear to rely on a functionality of iden-
tification, which must be distinguished from the functionality
of verification of biometrics.35 A verification system is the process
of comparing the biometric data of an individual acquired at
the time of the matching with one single biometric template
(referred to as a 1:1 matching process). The biometric data may
be stored in an individual device36 or in a central database.37
In contrast, a system of identification involves the comparison
of biometric data with a number of previously stored biomet-
ric templates (referred to as a 1:n matching process). Such
systems necessarily involve the centralized storage of biomet-
ric characteristics, although certain security measures may be
applied to prevent unauthorized access, but they also present
higher risks of further use for incompatible purposes (func-
tion creep), tracing or surveillance and identity theft.38
We will now see how the requirements of a “delineated area”
and of a “major stake, which surpasses the strict interest of the or-
ganization” have been interpreted in certain concrete situations
by the CNIL.
2.2.1. The delimitation of a specific restricted area
Certain restricted areas of a given place may require the in-
stallation of a biometric gate to filter access to particular rooms.
Such systems have been authorized by the CNIL regarding
access control to the strong room of a casino by a limited
number of designated employees, for example.39 The CNIL also
authorized the deployment of a comparable system to control
access to the operating rooms of a Hospital Centre subject to
unauthorized intrusions.40 However, the CNIL rejected a com-
parable system that was not limited to operating rooms, but
extended to the recovery room, cloakrooms and other areas
of the hospital since the system appeared to respond to a
“general security” objective and was not limited to a re-
stricted area.41
2.2.2. The requirement of a “major stake which surpasses
the strict interest of the organization”
The requirement of a “major stake, which surpasses the strict in-
terest of the organization” is of course decisive in the policy of
the CNIL with respect to the central storage of fingerprints. For
example, the storage of fingerprints in a centralized server has
been authorized with the intention of identifying employees
permitted to access a SEVESO-classified42 chemical plant, con-
trolling access to the Satellite Control Centre,43 to the National
31 CNIL’s Communication regarding central storage of finger-
print of 2007, available here: http://www.cnil.fr/fileadmin/
documents/approfondir/dossier/CNI-biometrie/Communication
-biometrie.pdf (last accessed 1/11/2015).
32 See for example deliberation n°023–2005 of 17 February 2005 au-
thorizing the French Central Bank to deploy a biometric system
to control access of employees to sensitive areas.
33 See deliberation n°254–2007 of 13 September 2007 refusing the
deployment of a biometric system relying on the verification of fin-
gerprint by the society Ecureuil Lease.
34 Els Kindt, op. cit., pp. 353–363.
35 See the definition and implications of verification systems and
identification systems in Opinion 3/2012 of Article 29 Working Party
on developments in biometric technologies of 27 April 2012, WP193,
pp. 5–6.
36 The biometric data may be stored in a personal device, as a
laptop, or on a token or a badge belonging to the data subject.
37 The centralized storage may be preferred by data controllers
when the use of a badge or a token is proved inappropriate in given
circumstances (e.g. risks of loss). In this case, the data subject is
generally active in order to extract the biometric template from
the central database prior to the matching. Most frequently, the
extraction/selection of the template in carried out through a PIN
code known exclusively by the data subject.
38 See Els Kindt, op. cit., pp. 647–654.
39 Deliberation n°088–2007 and n°092–2008 authorizing the central
storage of fingerprint by the Casinos of Nivernais and La Baule to
control access to the strongroom.
40 Deliberation n°080–2007 of 25 April 2007 authorizing the Hos-
pital of Strasbourg to deploy a biometric system relying on
fingerprint to control access to operation rooms.
41 Deliberation n°328–2008 of 11 September 2008 refusing the de-
ployment of a biometric system relying on fingerprint to control
access to certain areas of the “association hospitalière de l’Ouest”.
42 Deliberation n°051–2007 of 21 March 2007 authorizing Millen-
nium Chemicals Thann SAS to deploy a fingerprint biometric system
to access to sensitive areas of the chemical plant and delibera-
tion n°2011-280 of 21 September 2011 authorizing TRAFICTIR Rhone-
Alpes to deploy a fingerprint biometric system to control access
to the site.
43 Deliberation n°464–2010 of 9 December 2010 authorizing
EUTELSAT SA to deploy a fingerprint biometric system to control
access to the satellite control posts.
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Printing office where ID cards and passports are printed,44 to
control access to government servers containing large amount
of personal data,45 or to control access to premises where
classified/confidential information is stored.46 In contrast, the
CNIL has rejected a comparable system intended to control the
access of employees to the offices of the CEO of a CAC 40
company.47 According to the CNIL, “nothing demonstrates that the
potential intrusion of unauthorized persons would threaten the pro-
tection of goods or people essential to the collectivity.” It further adds
that “the sole fact of being the CEO of a CAC 40 company does not
in itself justify recourse to a central fingerprint database.” It is one
of the rare decisions where the CNIL provides some further in-
terpretation of the criterion of a “major stake” referring to the
“protection of goods or people essential to the collectivity”.
The storage of fingerprints in a terminal/reader, not con-
nected to any network, seems more acceptable to the CNIL.
Many decisions nevertheless lack contextual information about
the activities of the organizations requesting authorizations
for a biometric system. It is therefore difficult to evaluate the
relevance of the security needs invoked. For example, in two
decisions of the same day, the CNIL reached two opposite con-
clusions regarding access control to computer rooms. On the
one hand, it rejected a biometric system based on the storage
of fingerprints in a reader to control access to the servers of
a data processing centre, although the activity of the company
is related to the processing and storage of a large amount of
data.48 In this first decision, the CNIL recalls its doctrine and
notices that the requesting organization failed to prove a “major
stake, which surpasses the strict interest of the organization.” On the
other hand, the CNIL authorized the use of a comparable system
to control access to an SME’s server specialized in biometric
systems. In this decision, the CNIL avoids invoking the crite-
rion of a “major stake” and apparently justifies its decision on
technical security grounds (the adoption of strong security mea-
sures to protect the biometric templates stored in the reader).49
In this decision, the criterion of a “major stake” is simply put
aside, and not even discussed. In our view, the activity of the
company (producing biometric systems) can hardly qualify as
a “major stake, which surpasses the interests of the organization”.
It is rather unfortunate that the CNIL abandoned this crite-
rion in this particular case and judged the system admissible
on technical security grounds only.
2.3. General security objective
When the organization fails to demonstrate a “pressing secu-
rity need” and instead pursues a general or vague objective of
security of its premises and/or devices, the CNIL admits the
use of two alternative types of biometric systems. First, the CNIL
recommends the recourse to verification systems (see supra the
distinction with identification systems) with a storage of the
biometric characteristic in an individual device exclusively held
by the data subject, which presents less risks in case of loss
or attack. Biometric access controls to professional comput-
ers and applications are systematically authorized by the CNIL,
whatever the biometric characteristics (with trace or not) if these
are stored in an individual device.50 According to the CNIL, such
systems do not present any specific risk for the individual’s
rights to privacy and data protection.51 Second, if tokens or
badges are considered inappropriate in certain circumstances,
the CNIL favours the recourse to biometric data leaving no trace.
In particular, systems relying on hand geometry, hand/finger
vein recognition and iris scans (which are considered as leaving
no trace by the CNIL), have been authorized in the profes-
sional context, even when stored centrally.52 Again, we can see
that beyond the functionality of the system (verification or iden-
tification) and type of storage (centralized or not), the type of
biometric data has been of particular importance in the de-
cision to authorize or refuse the use of biometrics for general
security objectives.
3. Biometrics in the school environment
The use of biometrics in the school environment, in particu-
lar to access school catering has been generalized in the 2000’s.
The enrolment of minors in the school environment is the
second major context of deployment of biometric systems in
France. Hundreds of biometric systems have been installed in
secondary and high schools in order to control and manage
access to school catering. In this context, instead of security-
related motivations, the deployment of biometrics appears to
be commanded by an imperative of management.53 In 2005 and
2006, the CNIL indeed authorized the use of hand geometry
to control access to school catering and further adopted the
unique authorization AU-009. The system is supposed to limit
identity fraud and facilitate the issuing of invoices. Since then,
only three special decisions relate to other biometric uses in
44 Deliberation n°113–2005 of 7 June 2005 authorizing the Na-
tional Printing Office to deploy a fingerprint biometric system to
control access to the places where ID cards and passports are pro-
duced.
45 Deliberation n°256–2007 of 13 September 2007 authorizing the
Inter-Regional Centre of Information Processing of Lyon to deploy
a fingerprint biometric system to control access to certain re-
stricted areas, where servers of the public administration are located.
46 Deliberation n°223–2011 of 21 July 2011 authorizing the society
Compagnie Européenne d’Intelligence Stratégique to deploy a fin-
gerprint biometric system to control access to restricted areas where
sensitive files with high level of classification are stored.
47 Deliberation n°056–2008 of 6 March 2008 refusing GIE 32 Hoche
to deploy a fingerprint biometric system to control access to the
offices of the CEO of Bouygues SA.
48 Deliberation n°257–2011 of 21 September 2011 refusing the in-
stallation of a biometric system based on fingerprint by the data
processing Centre GROUPE MIT. See also a decision where the CNIL
rejected a comparable system to control access to the computer
room of a society developing gambling software, deliberation n°185–
2011 of 23 June 2011.
49 Deliberation n°282–2011 of 21 September 2011 authorizing the
installation of a biometric system based on fingerprint by the society
BE METRICS.
50 We count 59 authorizations and none refusal.
51 See CNIL’s Annual Activity report 2001, p. 171.
52 We count 103 authorizations of use of hand geometry and finger/
palm vein recognition systems with a central storage in the reader
or in server in the professional context and none refusal.
53 Xavier Guchet, « La biométrie à l’école : une approche
anthropologique », in L’identification biométrique, Champs, acteurs, enjeux
et controverses, op. cit., pp. 161–176.
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the school environment, which have all been rejected by the
CNIL. Hereunder we will comment three major findings re-
garding CNIL’s approach to biometrics in the school
environment.
3.1. Type of biometric characteristic and type of system
In 2011, the CNIL rejected the use of finger vein recognition
to control access to school restaurants, considering that this
biometric characteristic was more intrusive than hand
geometry.54 According to the CNIL, although finger vein is pres-
ently a biometric technology that does not leave a trace,
alongside hand geometry, finger vein constitutes a more ac-
curate biometric characteristic, and its use should be strictly
limited regarding minors. The recourse to finger vein for the
purposes of controlling access to school restaurants was there-
fore considered disproportionate.The intrusive character of the
biometric system is also evaluated according to the accuracy
of the biometric characteristic. The more accurate and stable
the biometric characteristic the more intrusive will be the
system, notably with respect to minors whose biometric char-
acteristics may not be definitive and are subject to evolution.
Whereas in other contexts, the efficiency of biometric systems
(often correlated to the level of accuracy of biometrics) is gen-
erally one of the core reasons invoked for justifying the use
of biometric data, this argument is actually irrelevant in the
case of minors. Indeed, because of their age, the CNIL prefers
the recourse to biometric data that will be less stable in time
and subject to change.
Besides, the CNIL provides that the biometric system shall
be associated with a personal identification code in order to
be activated, so that the system relies on a functionality of veri-
fication (1:1 matching).55 In this case, the CNIL authorizes the
central storage of the hand geometry in the reader, but re-
quires the individuals to enter a PIN code in order to proceed
to the matching. Surprisingly, the CNIL does not explicitly
address the possibility of storing the biometric template in an
individual badge. We suppose that the central storage of the
biometric templates in the reader, instead of a decentralized
storage, is motivated by the fact that badges would prove in-
appropriate due to frequent loss or pupils’ failure to carry them.
3.2. The use of biometrics for security-related purposes is
disproportionate
The CNIL has rejected the deployment of biometric systems
for security-related purposes, such as the use of fingerprint to
control pupil access to school premises56 or the use of finger
vein to control access to the luggage storage.57 In both deci-
sions, the CNIL emphasizes the intrusive character of the
biometric characteristics chosen, respectively fingerprint and
finger vein and the type of system envisaged (centralized storage
of biometric data). But most importantly, it is the purpose for
which the biometric system is envisaged that appears prob-
lematic for the CNIL. In both cases, the CNIL considers that
the security-related purposes pursued could be achieved
through non-biometric solutions. It therefore appears clearly that
the CNIL is not willing to authorize biometric systems for such
purposes in schools.
3.3. Consent as the legitimate basis
In its unique authorization AU-009 regarding the use of hand
geometry to control access to school restaurants, the CNIL pro-
vides that individuals must be properly informed about the
processing of their biometric information and explicitly consent
to be enrolled in the system.58 A minor individual and his/
her parents or legal representative must consent. Their right
to object to the processing of their biometric information shall
be respected and alternative means to control access be imple-
mented. The requirement of the individual’s consent, as
provided by article 7 a) of the directive 95/46, follows from the
purposes of the biometric system, which are related to a general
goal of identity management in order to grant access to the
catering, fight against identity fraud and facilitate billing ad-
ministration. Contrary to the use of biometric data in the
professional context, where “legitimate interests” of security are
invoked, here the goal of identity management is overridden
by the legitimate interests of fundamental rights and free-
doms of individuals arising from article 7 f) of the same
directive.
4. Biometrics in the commercial environment
Only 29 decisions deal with the enrolment of customers in bio-
metric systems to access commercial services, among which
3 have been rejected by the CNIL. Although few in number, each
deliberation is especially enlightening as to the conditions under
which biometrics may expand in everyday life in the future
(see also section 7.1).
4.1. The condition of storage in an individual device
In the context of the commercial environment, it is the type
of storage rather than the biometric characteristic, which proves
to be decisive. The CNIL strictly applies the requirement of a
decentralized storage in an individual device.
This requirement has been applied to casinos where bio-
metric systems have been widely deployed as a means to speed-
up access control at the entrance. The installation of biometric
54 Deliberation n°147–2011 of 19 May 2011 refusing the College
ATURRI to deploy a finger vein biometric system in order to control
access to the catering.
55 Unique Authorization AU-009 of 27 April 2006, article 5.
56 Deliberation n°178–2008 of 26 June 2008 refusing the high school
of Boulogne-Le Portel to deploy a fingerprint biometric system to
control access to the establishment. The system was in particu-
lar intended to prevent unauthorized people from accessing the
premises, preventing pupils below the age of 16 to leave the school
without prior authorization and fight against school absenteeism.
57 Deliberation n°388–2011 of 1 December 2011 refusing the high
school LES IRIS to use finger vein recognition to control access to
the luggage storage.
58 Unique Authorization AU-009 of 27 April 2006, article 6.
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systems followed from a modified legislation,59 providing that
casinos had to put in place strict identity controls to check
whether their customers are allowed access to gambling es-
tablishments. Indeed, gambling establishments are forbidden
to minors and any individuals included in a black list main-
tained by the Ministry of Homeland Security.60 The entrance
into force of the decree resulted in a substantial increase in
the identification processing time per customer. In order to in-
crease the efficiency of identity checks, casinos sought to deploy
biometric verification systems to speed-up this process for pre-
vetted frequent customers.The CNIL authorized the enrolment
of frequent customers for the purpose of the verification (1:1
matching) of their identity, with a storage of the biometric in-
formation as a template and in an individual device (card)
exclusively under the control of customers.61 However, the CNIL
rejected the deployment of a biometric identification system
(1:n matching), where the biometric information was stored
in a centralized server, considering the interference into in-
dividual’s rights disproportionate.62
Apart from casinos, four special authorizations concern the
deployment of biometric verification systems in recreational
spaces (e.g. sports facilities) with a view to verifying cus-
tomer identity and combating identity fraud, judged prejudicial
to the economic benefit of the owners.63 In all cases, the bio-
metric information is stored on an individual device exclusively
held by the data subjects. In contrast, the CNIL rejected the
deployment of a biometric system in hotels intended to iden-
tify customers, mainly because the proposed system relied on
the centralized storage of biometric information and a system
of identification. Instead it suggests that biometric templates
should be stored in an individual device under the control of
individuals.64
The decentralized storage of the biometric information on
an individual device held exclusively by the data subject appears
to be a strict condition for the biometric identity control of cus-
tomers. Considering that biometric access control to commercial
services relies much on convenience motivations and not on
reasons of strict necessity, it is legitimate to require the sys-
tem’s characteristics to present the least level of data protection
risk possible.
4.2. Consent as the legitimate basis
As in the case of schools, the enrolment of customers in bio-
metric systems is not compulsory and can only be carried out
on a voluntary basis. Customers must be provided with an al-
ternative non-biometric identity control procedure and cannot
be enrolled without their explicit and specific consent. The le-
gitimate interests of the controllers, such as the fight against
identity fraud for the economic well-being of the firm, are in
no wise considered sufficient to override the individual’s rights
and freedoms. As a consequence, and in compliance with data
protection legislation, the legitimate basis of such systems must
rely on the individual’s consent to enrol in the system.
5. Biometrics for research or experimental
purposes
Biometric systems deployed for purposes of research or ex-
periment constitute the third most important use for which
controllers are requesting special authorizations to the CNIL.
Over the 41 relevant decisions, all biometric systems have been
authorized by the CNIL, and only in exceptional cases has the
CNIL restricted the scope of the experiment.65 Two types of de-
cisions can be distinguished: those relating to research purposes
and those requested for real experimentation of biometric
systems, which are therefore deployed in real conditions. This
second category is very relevant since it shows potential future
uses of biometrics presently at the experimental stage that
could be widely deployed in a mid-term perspective. In all cases,
individuals are enrolled on a voluntary basis, and their consent
therefore legitimizes processing.
The CNIL showed itself to be very open to research and ex-
perience in the field of biometrics. Firms in the security and
surveillance sector request authorizations for field trials of new
biometric access control systems.66 One authorization related
to the use of thermal information for the improvement of
the interface between the on-board computer and the driver
in the auto industry.67 11 special authorizations have been
delivered in the banking sector. Most of them relate to experi-
mentation with biometric authentication of customers in order
to increase the security of contactless payments.68 In this case,
the biometric characteristic is stored in the card and used to
authenticate the customer instead of the traditional PIN code.
CNIL’s deliberations also relate to experimentation with voice
authentication of customers for phone-banking services, again
59 Decree n°59–1489 of 22 December 1959 regulating gambling
places and casinos as modified by Decree 2006-1595 of 13 Decem-
ber 2006.
60 While individuals can voluntarily ask to be registered in the
blacklist, some are registered following an administrative exclusion.
61 See for instance, deliberation n°146–2007 of 21 June 2007 au-
thorizing the use of fingerprint to control access to the Casino of
Cap d’Agde.
62 Deliberation n°131–2010 of 20 May 2010 refusing the Casino Royal
Concorde to use fingerprint to control access to the casino.
63 See notably deliberation n°138–2007 of 21 June 2007 and delib-
eration n°196–2013 of 11 July 2013.
64 Deliberation n°526–2009 of 24 September 2009 refusing the
Society APPIA to install a fingerprint biometric system to control
access to the hotel.
65 See for example, deliberation n°423–2011 of 15 December 2011
about the research project SAIMSI aiming at the automatic iden-
tification of a speaker or an author of a text. The consortium
involved the French Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Home-
land Security and the overall goal was to increase the automatic
identification of authorship of some online content.
66 See for instance deliberation n°84–2008 of 27 March 2008 for the
experimentation of a mobile biometric identification device.
67 Deliberation n°264–2014 of 26 June 2014.
68 See for instance, deliberation n°039–2012 of 2 December 2012
regarding the experimentation of a contactless payment means with
multimodal biometric system (fingerprint and finger vein
recognition).
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as a means to increase the security of communications and
transactions.69
Besides these, one of the most remarkable experiments
relates to the real world trial of a biometric system for the iden-
tification of patients by the Centre Oscar Lambret, a hospital
radiotherapy service.70 More specifically, two consecutive au-
thorizations have been issued, each one for a one-year trial
period. These trials are of particular interest given the poten-
tial of biometrics in monitoring identity in hospitals and the
healthcare system in general. Indeed, identity monitoring in
the hospital context refers to the management of identity and
risks of error in the identification of patients, which exists in
all hospitals and has a potential to cause accidents, and which
require the deployment of procedures and monitoring systems
to avoid such accidents.71 The trial was carried out in a radio-
therapy service, where patients are generally treated several
times a week during several weeks (an average of 5 sessions
a week during 4 to 7 weeks).72 The Center treats an average of
300 patients per day and carries out about 30,000 sessions of
radiotherapy per year. Multiple health actors are involved and
work on a just-in-time basis. Accurate identification of pa-
tients is a high priority and it is not surprising that the efficiency
of biometric technologies may be tested in such a context.
The first authorization concerned the storage of finger-
prints in a central database for the purposes of the identification
(1:n matching) of the patient. The use of fingerprint was pre-
ferred to the use of finger vein by considering scientific studies
demonstrating that finger vein could significantly be altered
as a consequence of chemotherapy treatment (often com-
bined with radiotherapy). Moreover, the decentralized storage
of the biometric characteristic (e.g. in a smart card) was dis-
carded due to risk of loss or forgetfulness. The decision makes
clear that the biometric technology is used in support of the
organization of the service and can in no case take the place
of the final human checking. In practice, the person operat-
ing the computers and machine is responsible for a final check
of a patient’s identity before launching the session. The results
of the first year of experimentation showed that 17 false iden-
tifications occurred for 28,391 sessions and that accidents were
avoided thanks to the systematic human checking.73 Al-
though the system was deemed well-accepted among the
patients, the use of fingerprint proved inappropriate for 5% of
patients. According to the CNIL, the interest of biometric
technologies in terms of public health is therefore not
demonstrated.74 The CNIL nevertheless authorized a second one-
year trial, aiming at increasing the accuracy of the system with
a combination of both fingerprint and finger vein. However, it
rejected the extension of the experiment to hospitalized minors
below the age of 15. Although biometrics can be very prom-
ising for identity monitoring in the hospital context, it follows
from the CNIL’s decision, that the legitimacy of biometrics in
such a context relies heavily on its efficiency in eliminating
false identification of patients. As the CNIL reminds us, a com-
parative evaluation of non-biometric identification and its
associated risks and accidents with biometric identification of
patients still needs to be carried out.75
6. Other uses
There are a number of other decisions concerning the instal-
lation of biometric systems in other contexts. Although they
represent a small minority, they are nevertheless particularly
interesting as they enlighten us as to possible further con-
texts for the use of biometrics. We will comment in this section
the enrolment of vulnerable people in biometric systems on
the one hand and the use of biometric data to identify can-
didates to an exam on the other.
6.1. Biometrics systems and vulnerable people
In 2008, the CNIL authorized the use of a biometric system to
control access to a social accommodation and rehabilitation
centre to prevent unauthorized access.76 The fingerprint tem-
plate is stored on a personal badge, but most importantly the
individuals hosted in the Centre are provided with the choice
to refuse the system. In a comparable context of access control
to a community home of young workers, the CNIL rejected the
installation of a biometric system on the ground that indi-
viduals were not provided with the choice of whether or not
to be enrolled in the system.77 In a particularly interesting third
decision, the CNIL authorized an identification system (1: n
matching) relying on the central storage of finger vein data to
control the presence of mentally disabled persons at work.78
The goal of the system is to control the presence of employ-
ees in the bus driving them to their work and at the work
premises in order to signal any absence to their family or legal
representative and thereby facilitate potential searches. In brief,
the system intends to “offer more autonomy to mentally disabled
persons while guaranteeing their security”.79 A system of identi-
fication with central storage of the biometric data is justified
because badges proved inappropriate due to recurrent loss or
failure to carry and inability of the persons concerned to memo-
rize a PIN code. In this context, it is stated that the system
satisfies the condition of proportionality, in particular because
69 See deliberation n°375–2014 of 25 September 2014 for the ex-
perimentation of a system “talk to pay” (voice recognition of
customers).
70 Deliberation n°033–2010 of 11 February 2010 providing a first au-
thorization of a simple biometric identification system (fingerprint)
and deliberation n° 236–2012 of 12 July 2012 extending the experi-
mentation with a multimodal biometric system (fingerprint and
finger vein) in order to increase accuracy results.
71 It is referred to as “identitovigilenge” in French.
72 Deliberation n°33–2010, op. cit.
73 Deliberation n°236–2012, op. cit.
74 Idem.
75 Idem.
76 Deliberation n°324–2008 of 11 September 2008 authorizing the
use of fingerprint stored in an individual device to control access
to an Accommodation and Rehabilitation Centre.
77 Deliberation n°492–2008 of 11 December 2008 refusing the in-
stallation of a biometric system relying on the storage of fingerprint
in a badge to control access to a community home of young workers.
78 Deliberation n°038–2008 of 7 February 2008 authorizing the
support work centre (Centre d’Aide au Travail) « Le Vert Coteau »
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the system relies on biometric data that do not leave a trace
and that the individual’s consent, in concertation with their
family and legal representatives, will be respected. This deci-
sion constitutes an illustration where the requirement of
decentralized storage is put aside considering the category of
persons involved and the purpose of the system, which is more
related to a “care” use of biometrics than a security-related use.
The potential expansion of such biometric uses raises, in
our view, some important societal and legal questions. First,
we observe that when taking into account possible alterna-
tive to biometrics, CNIL’s analysis is much focused on
technological solutions (badges with bar code and PIN code)
and does not expressly address non-technological solutions,
in particular a human accompanying framework. The biomet-
ric system and its characteristics (centralized storage and
function of identification) are assessed on the basis of a “con-
venience” standard rather than a “necessity” standard. In our
view, a much deeper reflection and concertation is needed on
the “care” uses of biometrics in accompanying disabled indi-
viduals. Second, in these three decisions, the individuals
enrolled in the system are vulnerable people, either due to social
condition or disability, and much of the legitimacy of the system
is derived from the individuals’ consent to participate. This
raises the question in our view of the extent to which vulner-
able people may “freely” give consent to the processing of their
biometric data and thus provide an adequate legal basis for
such processing.
6.2. Identification of candidates to an exam
The CNIL authorized The Graduate Management Admission
Council (GMAC) to deploy a biometric system based on palm
vein recognition of candidate students to the Graduate Man-
agement Admission Test (GMAT), which is a worldwide exam
organized to select candidates to MBA (Master of Business Ad-
ministration) programmes.80 The exam is indeed organized in
identical conditions in about 110 countries each year for an
average of 200,000 candidates, with the aim of selecting stu-
dents for about 1800 MBA programmes and high schools
worldwide. In France, 8 different centres are managed by the
GMAC and about 2000 candidates take the GAMT exam each
year.The goal of the biometric system is to avoid identity fraud,
in particular the substitution of one candidate by another. GMAC
reported past cases of proven fraud, notably in 2004 where 6
“professional candidates” took the exam in the place of 186
persons in exchange for remuneration.81 Because of these cases
of established fraud, GMAC justifies the deployment, in other
countries, of an identification system of candidates based on
their fingerprint in order to avoid identity substitution. In the
case of France, and because of the restrictions imposed by
the CNIL, GMAC proposed recourse to palm vein recognition,
which is considered less intrusive as it is a biometric charac-
teristic that is deemed without trace. The biometric systems
nevertheless involve the centralized storage of the biometric
templates in a central database in the United States of America,
where the server is located. Retention of the biometric char-
acteristics is planned for five years, which corresponds to the
validity period of the exam.
This case is of particular interest in several respects. Firstly,
it derogates to the CNIL’s approach with respect to the legiti-
mate basis of the biometric system. As we have seen, biometric
systems pursuing a security-related objective generally invoke
the protection of “legitimate interests” of the controller and
are exempted from the necessity to obtain the individuals’
consent. In contrast, biometric systems pursuing objectives
linked to the fight against identity fraud, without any under-
lying “security” rationale, as is the case of the GMAT exam, have
always been subject to prior individual consent (see supra “bio-
metrics in school environment”, “biometrics in commercial
environment”). The GMAC decision therefore constitutes the
first authorization of compulsory enrolment in a biometric
system that does not pursue a security-related goal.
Secondly, this decision is remarkable as it authorizes a cen-
tralized storage of the biometric characteristics and an
identification-matching process (1:n matching), which there-
fore involves important data protection risks. Again, in the
absence of security-related justification, the CNIL generally re-
quires the deployment of a system of verification (see supra
for comparison “biometrics in the school environment”). This
decision demonstrates that although the CNIL has elabo-
rated a comprehensive proportionality policy (see infra), certain
particular circumstances may lead the Supervisory Authority
to revise and adapt the application of this policy. In this par-
ticular case, it is apparent that the worldwide character of the
exam, with its high risk of fraud, on the one hand, and the cri-
terion of capturing a biometric characteristic that does not leave
trace on the other, were decisive in granting the authorization.82
However, as we will see now, recent technological evolutions
should lead the CNIL to deeply reconsider this approach.
7. Conditions of proportionality: evolution
and perspectives
7.1. CNIL’s conditions of proportionality under evolution
From 2005 to 2013, CNIL’s methodology for the evaluation of
biometric systems was said to be based on the following cri-
teria: i) the distinction between “pressing security need”
requiring the securitization of a delimited area representing
a “major stake, which surpasses the sole interest of the organiza-
tion” and more general securitization goals or identity
management purposes; ii) the distinction between biometric
data leaving a trace and biometric data leaving no trace; and
iii) the place of storage of the biometric data, distinguishing
the central storage in a server or in the reader and the storage
80 Deliberation n°360–2009 of 18 June 2009 authorizing GMAC
(Graduate Management Admission Council) represented by Pearson
Education France to install a biometric system to control access
to examination rooms in order to prevent identity fraud and sub-
stitution of candidates.
81 CNIL’s Annual activities report 2009, p. 55.
82 See the interview of J.-F. Carrez, Commissioner at the CNIL in
charge of “Education and superior education” in CNIL’s Annual ac-
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in an individual device exclusively under the control of the data
subject.
Another criterion, which is not formally expressed, relates
to our view of the categories of persons enrolled in biometric
systems and the legitimate basis associated with the process-
ing of their biometric data. CNIL’s approach indeed distinguishes
two main categories of people/legitimate basis: i) the enrol-
ment of employees in biometric systems relying on the
legitimate interests of the organization (generally security-
related purposes); ii) the enrolment of minors and customers
(in general for identity management purposes) or volunteers
(experimental and research purposes), the legitimate basis of
which is the data subject’s consent. The CNIL is indeed much
stricter regarding the enrolment of minors and customers than
employees for example. In turn, the CNIL is also stricter re-
garding the enrolment of minors than customers. The context
of implementation of biometric systems (school, work etc.) is
in practice, the primary criterion when assessing the propor-
tionality of a system.
Technological developments have nevertheless led the CNIL
to reconsider its policy, in particular, with respect to two of these
criteria. First, the distinction between biometric data leaving
a trace and biometric data leaving no trace is less and less rel-
evant. Rapid technological evolutions show that biometric data
that were not considered as “leaving trace” and thus suscep-
tible to be captured and used without the knowledge of the
individuals must now be considered as biometric data leaving
a trace. A striking example is “face recognition”. Multiple uses
online make faces more and more subject to biometric iden-
tification. Another example is finger/hand vein recognition or
iris recognition which tends to allow more and more contactless
systems, thus paving the way to possible use without the knowl-
edge of the individual. As noticed by E. Kindt, “whether biometric
characteristics can be captured with or without the presence and/or
cooperation or knowledge of the data subject is not neutral as it
depends on the state of the art of particular biometric technology at
a given moment”,83 implying that more biometric characteris-
tics may leave traces over the years and become apt for hidden
collection and comparison. Aware of these evolutions, the CNIL
has abandoned this distinction since mid-2013. Along with E.
Kindt, we believe this new approach is most welcome.
Second, concerned by the increasing recourse to biomet-
ric technologies to identify/authenticate individuals, the CNIL
decided to launch in 2012 a deep reflection regarding the use
of biometrics in an individual’s everyday life.84 The goal of the
CNIL was to proactively address the multiplication of biomet-
ric identification in everyday life, from the work place to the
use of biometric bank credit card or the identification of pa-
tients in hospitals, public services, commercial services etc.This
led the CNIL to order a survey regarding the perception of bio-
metrics by the French population.The results have showed that
the French population widely admits the use of biometric iden-
tification by State authorities for national-security and/or
forensic purposes.85 While the use of biometric identification
in the work environment receives mixed reactions, the French
population is however clearly reluctant to accept the use of bio-
metric technologies in a commercial context, including
biometric contactless payment means or access control to ca-
tering or recreational spaces. As a whole, the French population
showed itself reluctant to trivial uses of biometrics in every-
day life.86
These elements are certainly at the basis of a shift in policy.
The CNIL is considering emphasizing the categories of pur-
poses pursued by the biometric system. Indeed, in the report
on biometrics submitted to the Senate, the CNIL suggests a dis-
tinction between three types of systems:
1) “Security-related biometric systems”, which are those deemed in-
dispensable. In those cases, the biometric system is exclusive and
individuals cannot opt-out.
2) “Biometric systems as a service” (also called “biométrie de confort”
or “convenience biometrics”). In these cases, the security claims
are not sufficient to override individual’s rights. As a conse-
quence, individuals will have to be duly informed and explicitly
consent to be enrolled. Alternative access control means shall be
available in case of refusal.
3) “Biometric systems for research or experimental purposes”.87
Under such a renewed doctrine, the impact of the crite-
rion relating to the category of people enrolled in a biometric
system remains nevertheless unclear. Following this new ap-
proach, employees should consent to the processing of their
biometric data when the system fails to satisfy the “strict-
security” test under case 1. Indeed, we have seen that many
biometric systems are not necessarily deployed in a context
of “pressing security need”, but can be deployed for more
“general security purpose”. Under the new approach of the CNIL,
this second category of biometric systems should therefore fall
under case n°2 and the individual’s consent should become
necessary. However, this renewed doctrine raises some diffi-
culties in the work environment, where the validity of individual
consent may be questioned. Indeed, according to the Working
Party 29’s opinion there is a strong presumption that employ-
ee’s consent is invalid in the employment context, given the
imbalance of power between the employee and the employer.88
The Working Party 29 further asserted that the processing of
biometric data in the context of employment would there-
fore preferably be based on another lawful ground.89 Besides,
certain biometric uses analysed in the present contribution may
hardly fall into either of these categories, as for example the
GMAC authorization (see supra “identification of candidates to
83 Els Kindt, op. cit., p. 655.
84 CNIL Annual Activity Report 2012, p. 19, available here:
http://www.cnil.fr/fileadmin/documents/La_CNIL/publications/CNIL
_RA2012_web.pdf (last accessed 1/11/2015).
85 Sandra HOIBIAN, « Les Français se montrent réservés sur l’usage
de la biométrie dans la vie quotidienne », Report of the CREDOC
(Centre de Recherches pour l’Etude et l’Observation des Condi-
tions de Vie), May 2013, available here: http://www.credoc.fr/
publications/abstract.php?ref=R291 (last accessed 1/11/2015).
86 Idem.
87 Report of Senator François Pillet to the Senate of 16 April 2014,
op. cit., pp. 13–14.
88 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 15/2011 on the
definition of consent, 13 July 2011, WP187.
89 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 03/2012 on de-
velopments in biometric technologies, 27 April 2012, WP193, p. 11.
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an exam”). As a consequence, the CNIL’s new approach would
restrict the use of biometric systems and possibly prevent new
biometric uses from emerging.
7.2. Towards a condition of “strict security need”?
In May 2014, the French Senate adopted a bill of law destined
to limit the use of biometric technologies.90 The goal of the pro-
posal is to frame CNIL’s power of authorizations for biometric
systems in the private sector in compliance with article 25.I
8° of the Data Protection Act.91 Under this proposal, the pro-
cessing of biometric data shall be limited to cases of “strict
security necessity”, understood as “the protection of physical in-
tegrity of persons, the protection of goods or information the disclosure
or destruction of which would cause serious and irreversible harm
and which responds to a need that surpasses the strict interest of
the organization.” The formulation appears in part inspired by
CNIL’s policy with respect to the storage of fingerprints in
central databases. The consequences of such a proposal, if
adopted by the Legislator, would be quite significant for the
biometric industry.
Under the proposed framework, all uses that fail to satisfy
this “strict security need” criterion would be forbidden. This
implies that all current uses of biometrics that rely on indi-
viduals’ consent, such as the use of biometrics in schools and
for the provision/access to commercial services, would simply
become illegal, closing the door to any biometric develop-
ments in the private sector outside security-related motivations.
Although it is most welcomed that the Legislator endorses the
responsibility to frame the use of biometrics in the private
sector, we believe that Senator Gorse’s proposition is not nec-
essarily adequate, as it states once for all which biometric use
is admissible or not and does not leave sufficient margin of
appreciation, considering possible beneficial use of biomet-
rics in society outside the field of “security”. Although technical
and security aspects are not central to the present paper, we
believe such a legislative approach disregards potential tech-
nological security developments applied to biometrics: in the
field of encryption, revocability, irreversibility and the unpopu-
larity of templates, which are promising with regard to limiting
the data protection risks generated by the processing of bio-
metric data.92
8. Conclusions
CNIL’s experience in applying a proportionality test to bio-
metric systems installed in the private sector is of interest as
it contributes to illustrate, in concrete situations, where bio-
metric systems are currently expanding. In general, the CNIL
has proven to be quite consistent in applying its proportion-
ality policy over the last decade.
The CNIL long relied on the type of biometric data (with trace
and without trace) and type of storage (centralised and de-
centralized) to assess the impacts of a given system on
individuals’ rights.We believe that since the distinction between
biometric data leaving a trace and biometric data leaving
no trace is no longer relevant, the CNIL should instead put
more emphasis on the type of system (verification or identi-
fication) and the place of storage when carrying out the
assessment.93
Besides design characteristics, the category of people en-
rolled and the context in which the biometric system is to be
deployed, constitute crucial criteria in CNIL’s evaluation. In prac-
tice, the CNIL applies two standards of review, which are
essentially related to the legitimate basis of the processing. In
cases where the legitimacy of the biometric system will rely
on legitimate interests of the data controller, the necessity test
will be applied quite strictly. In contrast, where an individu-
al’s consent is required, the necessity test will be applied more
loosely. As a result, individual consent becomes the condi-
tion for the installation of a biometric system outside security-
related motivations. Respect for freely given, informed and
specific consent is critical but crucial, and requires a strict
interpretation.
The recent legislative proposal intended to limit the use of
biometrics to strict security situations may also limit the de-
velopment of biometrics outside the traditional borders of
security. We believe that such a proposal has the merit of gen-
erating a necessary debate with regard to the expansion of
biometrics in the everyday life. However, we also believe that
the Legislator should not be too prescriptive, in order to leave
space4 for technical innovations and potential beneficial uses
of biometrics in new areas where identity management is
crucial.
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